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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Appellate jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to the provisions of Section
78-2-2Q Utah Code Ann. (Rep. vol. 1998) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding
that pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure there were no disputed issues
of material fact and that the Defendant was, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
The second issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in its Amended Order in
granting the Defendant recovery of her attorneys fees pursuant to the provisions of Rule 11
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 78-27-56 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol 1996).
The standards for appellate review with regard to the above referenced issues are as
follows: On an appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate
court reviews the decision of the district court de novo, with no deference being given to the
decision of the district court. See, Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Garfield
County. 811 P.2d 184(Utah 1991); Winerger v. Froerer. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). In
determining the correctness of the district court's decision, the party against whom a motion
for summary judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the

inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most favorable to that party. See the
Mountain States and Winerger cases cited above.
With regard to the award of attorneys, the appellate court must review that award
from three standards. First, the appellate court will review the trial court's findings of fact
under the clearly erroneous standard. Second, the trial court's conclusions that attorneys fees
are justified under the facts are reviewed under the correction of error standard. Finally, the
trial court's determination of the amount and type of sanction to be imposed is reviewed
under the abuse of discretion standard. Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992).
The foregoing issues have been properly preserved on appeal. See the Motion Against
Summary Judgment together with the affidavits of Steve Moss and Steve Regan filed by the
Defendant (R83-88) and the Objection to Proposed Amended Order and Judgment filed by
the Defendant. (Rl 12-13).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS ON APPEAL
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose
interruption would be determinative of this appeal or of central importance to the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff, Steven A. Regan dba The Grocery Store (hereinafter "Regan") filed a
complaint, pro se, seeking primarily declaratory relief alleging that the Defendant, Karen
Blount (hereinafter "Blount") entered into an oral employment agreement with Regan
pursuant to which Blount agreed to work for Regan for one year. Regan alleged that valid
consideration was given for the employment agreement and that Blount breached this
2

agreement when she terminated her employment after only approximately five months.
Regan sought a determination by the trial court that the oral employment agreement was
enforceable and also sought damages in the amount of $88.90 plus punitive damages in the
amount of $7,500.00. When Regan was advised that punitive damages were not recoverable
on a contract claim, he dismissed the punitive damage claim.
Defendant moved for summary judgment claiming that the facts did not support the
existence of an oral employment agreement or, if the facts did support such an agreement,
the oral employment agreement was not enforceable. Defendant also sought recovery of
attorneys fees pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 78-27-56
Utah Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 1996). The District Court entered its Order and Judgment on
January 9,1998 granting Defendant summary judgment pursuant to the provisions of Rule
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That judgment was subsequently amended by the
Court under an Amended Order and Judgment dated February 23, 1998 pursuant to which
the District Court further granted Defendant's attorneys fees and costs in the amount of
$1,663.70.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Regan is an individual doing business as "The Grocery Store" in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah. Regan owns and manages the store. (R.28, 78).
2.

On or about February 25, 1996, Regan interviewed Blount while she was

shopping in his store to determine whether or not she was interested in a job. Following the
interview, Regan hired Blount as a cashier in the store. (R28, 78).
3

3.

During the course of the interview, Regan specifically asked Blount if she

would be willing to commit for employment for a period of one year and Blount responded
that she would. (R.78).
4.

As consideration for Blount's willingness to commit to work for one year,

Regan agreed to give Blount the number of hours that she requested, give her the schedule
that she requested, and pay her at a higher rate per hour than he would have paid a new
employee under similar circumstances who had not agreed to work for a full year. (R.78).
5-

Although Regan had other applicants for the same position, he hired Blount

because of her commitment to work for a full year. (R. 78).
6,

Notwithstanding this commitment to work for one year, on approximately May

22, 1996, Blount gave Regan notice that she would be quitting on June 10, 1996 and
terminated her employment on that date. (R.66).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Summary judgment was not appropriate and the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment to the Defendant. Accordingly, the decision of the district court should be reversed
and the case remanded. The basis for such reversal and remand may be summarized as
follows:
1.

Although oral employment contracts are presumed to be at will, that

presumption can be overcome by evidence of an agreement for employment for a specific
term.

4

2.

The terms of an oral employment agreement for a specific term are enforceable

by the employer as well as the employee.
3.

The record contains evidence of all of the elements of an enforceable

employment contract for a specific term, namely: an offer of employment for one year;
acceptance of that offer; and consideration given in the form of concessions in the schedule
of work the payment of a higher rate per hour and hiring Blount in preference to other
applicants.
4.

Although the evidence with regard to the offer and acceptance of the oral

employment contract was disputed, there were clearly disputed issues of material fact before
the trial court which should have precluded the granting of summary judgment.
5.

Where it is the employer that seeks to enforce the employment agreement the

employer must show that he performed his part of the agreement. The employee's proffer
of service for the full term is not a precondition to enforcement.
The award of attorneys fees to the Defendant was also inappropriate since there is no
evidence in this action that the Complaint was brought by Regan in bad faith or solely for
the purpose of delay or harassment. The fact that Regan, who filed this action pro se, sought
only minimal damages and inappropriately claimed punitive damages in this contract action,
which claim he immediately dismissed when the error was pointed out to him, is not
evidence that he filed his complaint in bad faith or solely for the purpose of harassing the
Defendant. As a business owner and operator, Regan had every right to have the court
determine whether an oral employment contract for the term of one year is enforceable in
5

Utah and if it is, that Blount breached that agreement even if the damages suffered by Regan
as a consequence of that breach were minimal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.

An Employer Can Enforce an Employment Contract Pursuant to Which the Employee

Agreed to Work for One Ywx,
Part of the confusion which undoubtedly led to the trial court's granting of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is that this action was brought in a context that
is clearly unusual, if not unique, in Utah case law. In virtually every reported case seeking
enforcement of oral or implied terms in an employment contract, the action was brought by
a terminated employee claiming wrongful termination. It was obvious that the trial court
didn't quite know what to do when the employer and not the employee was the Plaintiff.
In seeking to enforce the oral or implied terms in an employment contract, the plaintiff
has traditionally been faced with the presumption that any employment agreement, the terms
of which are not documented in writing, is an agreement at-will where the employer can
discharge the employee at any time without cause, and the employee can quit at any time,
without cause. This rule of presumption of an at-will relationship is of long standing under
Utah case law. See Price v. Western Loan & Savings Co.. 35 Utah 378,100 P. 677 (1909).
The Utah courts have also recognized that the at-will rule is not determinative in every case
6

since it is, after all, "merely a rule of contract construction and not a legal principle". Berube
v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P. 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, the case law has
constructed a number of exceptions to the at-will rule.
The most common exception to the implied at-will presumption is the implied in fact
contract. As this Court noted in Kirberg v. West One Bank 872 P.2d 39 (Ct. Ap. Utah 1994)
the Plaintiff may overcome the presumption of an at will contract "by showing that the
parties created an implied in fact contract, modifying the . . . at-will status." 872 P.2d at 41.
The criteria for such an implied in-fact contract was again well set forth in Evans v. GTE
Health Systems. Inc.. 857 P.2d 974, 977 (Ct. App. Utah 1993).
For an implied in fact contract term to exist, it must meet the requirements for
an offer of a unilateral contract. There must be a manifestation of the
employer's intent that is communicated to the employee and sufficiently
definite to operate as a contract provision. Furthermore, the manifestation of
the employer's intent must be of such a nature that the employee can
reasonably believe that the employer is making an offer of employment other
than employment at-will.
Perhaps the most complete discussion of this concept however, is found in the Utah
Supreme Court decision in Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. supra. The Supreme Court there
noted:
This presumption can be overcome by an affirmative showing by the Plaintiff
that the parties expressly or impliedly intended a specified term or agreed to
terminate the relationship for cause alone. . . . Although in the past, the
presumption in favor of at-will employment has been difficult to overcome,
rigid adherence to the at-will rule is no longer justified or advisable.
771P.2datl044.
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Is it only the employee who can overcome the presumption of an at-will contract and
enforce an oral agreement for a specified term or is the doctrine of implied in fact contract
as available to the employer as it is to the employee? There is nothing in the case law which
would indicate that the principles dealing with the proof and enforcement of an implied in
fact contract is not equally available to the employer. The question simply put is whether
there was a clear offer and an acceptance of a contract of employment for a specified term
and whether the party seeking enforcement of the term gave valid consideration.
B.

There Is Ample Evidence in the Record Supporting the Existence of a Valid

Employment Contract for a Term of One Year.
The affidavit of Regan is clear and unequivocal. He states that during the course of
the employment interview, he "specifically asked Ms. Blount if she would commit to work
for me at the Grocery Store, for a period of one (1) year. Ms. Blount specifically said 'yes'."
(R.78). Here there was an offer and acceptance of an employment contract to work in
Regan's store for a period of one (1) year. That offer and acceptance was also supported by
valid consideration. Not only did Regan hire Blount as opposed to other applicants for the
job in return for her commitment to work for one year, Regan also "agreed to (a) give her the
total number of hours she needed; (b) give her the hours she needed when she wanted those
hours; and (c) pay her at a higher rate per hour than I would have normally paid a new
employee." (R.78). Similarly, in the affidavit of Steve Moss, another employee of Regan's,
Mr. Moss testified that in a conversation with Blount, she asked Mr. Moss whether Regan
had made the same requirement that Moss commit to employment for one year as a condition
8

of his employment at the store. Mr. Moss replied that he had and then asked Blount if Regan
had made the same request of her. She replied "yes" (R.80).
While Blount denies all of these claims and asserts that she made no agreement to
work for the term of one year, it is not for the trial court, on a motion for summary judgment,
to choose between the conflicting affidavit testimony of the parties. In fact, on a motion for
summary judgment, if a choice is to be made by the court, the choice must always be made
in favor of the non-moving party. As the Utah courts have repeatedly confirmed, the party
against whom a motion for summary judgment has been made is entitled to have all the facts
presented and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom considered in a light most favorable
to the non-moving party. See e.g., Morris v. Farnsworth MotelT 123 Utah 289,259 P.2d 297
(1953); Pioneer Savings & LQJUI Agg'n, v. Pioneer Finance qnd Thrift CQ„ 18 Utah 2d 106,
417 P.2d 121 (1966); Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. supra.
Clearly, the only way the trial court could have granted summary judgment in this
case on the issue of whether there was implied in-fact agreement under which Blount agreed
to work for Regan for at least one year was for the trial court to simply have ignored and
disregarded the affidavits presented by Regan. While Regan was appearing pro se, and the
affidavits may not have been as artfully drafted as if he had been represented by counsel, that
is not justification for ignoring and disregarding those affidavits. They clearly contained
direct and affirmative statements of admissible evidence which supported Regan's Complaint
and his claim that Blount breached an agreement pursuant to which she committed to work
for Regan for one year.
9

C.

The Fact That Blount Failed to Work for the Full Year Doe? Not Make the Agreement

Unenforceable.
Unquestionably, the strangest argument made by Blount in support of her motion for
summary judgment was that since she did not in fact work the full year, there was a failure
of consideration and the agreement was not, therefore, enforceable. In support of that
argument, Blount cited to the trial court Johnson v. Morton Thiokolf Inc.. 818 P.2d 997 (Utah
1991). (R.30). What Blount fails to recognize, however, is that the comments of the Court
in Johnson were made in the context of an employee seeking to enforce an employment
agreement with the employer. There is no question that an employee alleging wrongful
termination or dismissal by an employer must demonstrate that the employee was prepared
to and did perform the employee's part of the contract and was prepared to continue with the
employment absent the discharge. As the court in Johnson noted, these are viewed as
unilateral contracts and the party seeking to enforce the term must have performed or at least
preferred performance of their part of the contract.
Here, it is the employer who seeks to enforce the contract and to hold the employee
to the employee's commitment to work for a specified period of time. If, as Blount argues,
there is no enforceable contract unless the employee works for the period of time agreed,
there could never be a breach by the employee and the employer would never have a claim.
It was the very act of quitting her job and refusing to complete the term of her employment
that created the breach upon which Regan has sued. Accordingly, the issue is not whether
Blount performed her part of the agreement and therefore gave valuable consideration which
10

would bind Regan but whether Regan performed his part of the agreement and gave valuable
consideration which would bind Blount. The Johnson case stands for nothing more than
hornbook contract law that a party seeking to enforce a unilateral contract must first
demonstrate that they performed their promise or was prevented by the other party from so
performing. Here the evidence is that Regan performed. He hired Blount in preference to
other applicants, he offered her the flexible hours he promised and paid her more than he
would have absent her agreement to work for one year. Regan presented to the trial court
all of the facts necessary to go to trial on the issue of the breach of the oral employment
contract.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS
FEES TO THE DEFENDANT.
If this Court reverses the trial court's award of summary judgment and remands the
case for trial, the issue of attorney's fees granted by the lower court will, of course, become
moot. As a consequence, the issue of the propriety of the award of attorneys fees becomes
relevant on this appeal only if this Court sustains the trial court's award of summary
judgment. It is in that context, and without admitting in any way that the grant of summary
judgment by the trial court was appropriate, that Regan now addresses the issue of the
attorney's fees.
It must be first noted that Regan did improperly insert in his complaint a claim for
punitive damages. This is clearly a contract action and a claim for punitive damages was,
11

therefore, inappropriate. It is not denied that the insertion of that claim would probably
constitute a technical violation of Rule 11, since Regan could not certify to the court that
the claim for punitive damages was warranted by existing law.
When Regan was advised that his claim for punitive damages had been improperly
pled, he immediately withdrew that claim. If the trial court's award of attorneys fees had
been limited to the very minimal amounts expended by counsel for the Defendant in getting
the claim for punitive damages withdrawn, there would likely be no issue over attorneys fees
in this case. The trial court, however, went far beyond that limited award and granted
Defendant full recovery of all of her attorneys fees incurred in entire case. In taking that step,
the trial court clearly went beyond its authority under either Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure or Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1996) and abused
its discretion in awarding the attorneys fees.
Blount's principle argument is that since Regan admitted that he intended to make an
example of Blount to his other employees this somehow demonstrates that the only purpose
of the claim filed by Regan was for harassment and that the complaint served no other valid
purpose. As a consequence, Blount argued, Plaintiffs claim was brought in bad faith.
That argument might have some validity if it was clear that the claim brought by
Regan was not supported by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension
of existing law. As demonstrated hereinabove, however, that is clearly not the case.
Although, as Blount argues, the presumption of employment at-will is present in this
case, Regan presented enough specific evidence to rebut the presumption and to create an
12

agreement for employment for a specified term. The fact that Blount made Regan mad when
she disregarded her commitment and quit and that Regan wanted to let Blount and all the rest
of his employees know that when they make a commitment and give their word, he expects
them to honor it, does not turn this into a frivolous or bad faith claim. If the sole criteria for
a finding of bad faith is that one party is upset and wants to teach the other party a lesson,
there would virtually be no good faith litigation.
In this case, however, Regan's pro-se complaint clearly stated a claim for breach of
an oral employment agreement for the specified term of one year. Regan presented evidence
by way of affidavits that demonstrated that there was a factual basis for the claim. He was
clearly entitled to have the court determine whether such a contract was enforceable and that
Blount breached that agreement. If, in the process, Blount and Regan's other employees
learned that Regan will hold them to their promises, that is hardly evidence of bad faith
litigation.
CONCLUSION
It is impossible to determine precisely why the trial court granted Defendant summary
judgment in its first Order and then gave Defendant her attorneys fees in the Amended Order,
since neither Order contains any findings of fact or conclusions of law disclosing the
rationale of the court. Regardless of what the trial court's unspoken reasons might have
been, however, a review of the record discloses that the trial court erred on both counts in
first granting summary judgment and then awarding attorney's fees.
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The Complaint filed by Regan stated a claim for breach of an oral employment
contract for a time certain of one year and he presented facts to the court by way of affidavits
which disclosed that this claim had a factual basis. Those same affidavits also raised
sufficient issues of material fact to allow Regan to go to trial on the issue of Blount's breach
of the oral employment agreement.
While this pro se Plaintiff may not have presented his material to the trial court in the
form she was use to seeing from licensed members of the bar, it is clear that, with the one
exception of the claim for punitive damages, he still got it right in this case and was entitled
to his day in court. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial
court granting Defendant summary judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for
trial.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of January, 1999.
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS

GLEN E. DAVIES
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the above and
foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, this 15th day of January, 1999,
to the following:
David M. Cook
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Glen E. Davies
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ADDENDUM
There are no constitutional provision, statutes, rules or regulations which are of
central importance in the brief. Attached hereto are copies of the Complaint, Answer,
Motion Against Summary Judgment, Affidavit of Steve Moss, Affidavit of Steve Regan,
Objection to Proposed Amended Order and Judgment, Order and Judgment and Amended
Order and Judgment all as contained in the record on appeal.

COMPLAINT

STEPHEN A. REGAN
DBA THE GROCERY STORE
PLAINTIFF, PRO SE
1224 SOUTH 400 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
TELEPHONE: (801) 485-2791

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II

STEPHEN A. REGAN
DBA THE GROCERY STORE,
PLAINTIFF,

COMPLAINT

DT\ CCD^oa^

CIVIL NO.1

VS.
KAREN BLOUNT,

JUDGE

DEFENDANT.

Plaintiff complains of the Defendant and for cause of action alleges as follows:
1. That Defendant, Karen Blount, is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2. That Plaintiff, Stephen A. Regan, is the owner/manager of The Grocery Store
located in Salt Lake County and that said business is licensed to do business in the State of
Utah.
3. That Karen Blount had an Agreement with Plaintiff Regan to perform work at The
Grocery Store for a period of one (1) year.
4. That Defendant Regan did not hire other possible employees in order to hire
Karen Blount
5. That Plaintiff Regan adhered to the Agreement between himself and Defendant
Blount by doing the following:
A. Paying Karen Blount extra wages to stay on the job for a
period of one (1) year, as per the Agreement;
B. Giving Karen Blount the number of hours per week that she
required, as per the Agreement;
C. Giving Karen Blount the specific hours of work that she
required, as per the Agreement
6. That Karen Blount breached her agreement with Plaintiff Regan by quitting her
employment at The Grocery Store and failing to stay for the agreed upon time of one (1)
year.

7. That Karen Blount violated the rules and procedures of her employment with The
Grocery Store by quitting her employment within a one (1) year time frame and without the
agreement of owner/manager Steve A. Regan.
8. That Karen Blount, by failing to honor her one (1) year time commitment, caused
a great deal of discomfort to the management and employees of The Grocery Store.
9. That Karen Blount, by failing to honor her one (1) year time commitment, cost
The Grocery Store $ 88.90 in the form of advertising expenses.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Regan prays to this honorable Court for Judgment as follows:

1. Payment of $7,500.00 to Stephen A. Regan dba The Grocery Store, in lawful
United States currency, as punitive damages.
2. Payment of $ 88.90 or that amount the Court deems necessary and proper to
offset the Grocery Store's advertising expense.
3. Payment for any and all costs, expenses and attorney fees incurred in the
enforcement of said Complaint and for any other relief this honorable Court deems proper
and correct.

DATED this 6th day of March, 1997

Stephen A. TCegan
Plaintiff, Pro Se

Plaintiffs address:
1224 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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NONAPPROPRIATED FUND INSTRUMENTALITY EMPLOYEE PEKrORMANCE RATING
(CmdMemo. AEAGA-C. dtd22 Mar88)

KAREN

JAN

91

482 90 4447
3b. Pay Band

3a. Position Title, Number
OPERATIONS CLERK

16

2. SSN

1. Name (Last, First, Ml)
BLOUNT

SUS DATE

POS* X16 5

NF 0 *

4. I agree that the AE Form 215-3A-R(TEMP) (Department of Army Position Guide (N
Funds)) reflects the duties of thefl)QSi>ion

lated

Employee's initials

Supervisor's Initials
5. Name and Location of Employing NAF Activity
USMCA COMMUNITY OPERATIONS DIV
rr.HR RRATfPU
6. Rating Period
9 0 JAN 02
From:

BOEBLINGEN OSNCOCC A 1 4
PANZER KAGERNE—APO OQO^G
9 1 JAN 01
To:

7. The Official Rating assigned:

Fxcellent

Satisfactory

•

Unsatisfactory -

•

Wis. Karen Blount receives an excellent hating £or outstanding service
as club operations clink at KG4A and Kg4B$Jan 1990-Jan1991.
Wis. Blount has been personally responsable lor the dally receipts and
papermrk &Kom Jan 1990 timu present. O^ten she is responsable lor as
much as $10,000. on a given date. Wis. Blount has a line eye lor detail
and when dealing with money that In itself a challange, one that she has
mastered.
In adxLUlon to kin. own duties; she. has been called upon to serve as cashier
and waitress on an almost daily basis, and bartender on occasion.
She has held a key role as a customer, service repres entatlv(e ol the. club
when organizing special functions to Include, completing party contracts,
and mailing required special arrangments over the past twelve, months.
Wis. Blount has been extremely helpful with other club opptatlons. [le Ententalnhent
booking and scheduling, Inventories, sucesslully impllmenting the MARKS {illng
system.) Wis. Blount has shown her knoledge ol club operations well above her
position level.
I would reccommend Mrs. Blount to ana other mcunajgytTfa the
systm)wWv out resjjwatlon, and have her return here at anu tlme.CJj^

Employee's signature does not necessarily constitute agreement with the rating, but does acknowledge that the position guide is
tccura te and discussion has been held concerning performance within the ra ting period

AS FORM 215-3B-R(TEMP)
MAR 88

This farm expires April, 1990.
' '
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AS;23
SP:
NA:The Grocery Store

CP:

CC:

Al:1224 S. 400 E.
CI:SLC
ZIP:84111
REF:
... AGENCY:
CLASS:100 RATE:tr SPRATE:
DEP:
COL:
PRDl:c DAYtsa SCHED:7/27,7x
PRD2:
DAY:
SCHED:
CASH:
REC:
BADJ:
MT:
M$:
PY:
CARD*:
„
XP;
OK-BY:
SORT:
NOTES:
3:
ttCOL:
COLOR INFO 1:
2:
ASSISTANT MANAGER/CASHIER[QL]
Mini-grocery, full or part-time, olose
to town, must be high school grad,
bondable, 21+, benefits poss.
Call after 9. 405-2791.[QL]

A2J

••

u

t\

D3:

X3:
SU:
ST:UT PO:

04:

ii llliiMiii

X4:

DISC:
FMT:
BOX:
BE:07/27 EN:08/02
TI:7
TS:
AF:
PRFS:
N$:+ m 88.90 D$:+
88.90
'•"*"* TO:23* HJ:Y000.38/0005

,.v„v^.,.„4,» ^iwu^.-.>,-,,..-„. E M D * OF-* A D

10:813614600
A ° • * f•.

£Pf

AC:801

PH:4854914 • OC :

TY:CN C

C P : 90 CCtKA;Oft/01,15:5ft

D5:

X5:KA

DS:

X4:KA;

ANSWER

THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION

^

#ft-o

ITALTLAK<L7

,

0;-^

STEPHEN A REGAN
DBA THE GROCERY STORE
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF,
CIVIL W&.

970002026

VS.
;tUt)GE McCLEVE
KAREN BLOUNT,
DEFENDANT.
Defendant responds to''the complaint as follows:
1. The Defendant did not have an Agreement or understanding
with Stephen Regan owner/manager of The Grocery Store to work for
any specified period of time.
a. During the interview I stated that my husband and I
should be stationed here for at least one year. I told him that
the Army has moved us seven times in the last six years. I could
not commit to work for any specified length of time.
b. I informed Mr. Regan during the interview that this
job was for fun money, contingent on my college course schedule
and family.
2. Mr. Regan failed to provide the Defendant with a safe
and ethical work environment and scheduling flexibility that was
requested.
a. My family and I did not feel that the working
conditions at The Grocery Store were safe. One incident involved
two men stealing a large quantity of beer while I was working
alone on a Friday night. Customers warned me repeatedly that I
was in danger.
b. The Grocery Store regularly sells expired products.
When I pointed this out to Mr. Regan he said "those dates are for
lawyers." One man returned a box of cereal that was out of date
by several years. I informed Mr. Regan and the cereal was later
put back en the shelf. Customers complained about expired
medications and spoiled food.

7

c. Mr. Regan did not provide me with a flexible work
schedule. As my schedule changed I had to negotiate with other
workers rather than worKing directly with Mr. Regan to change
shifts. This scheduling system failed to supply me with adequate
time for school and my family.
3. The Defendant gave Mr. Regan verbal resignation notice
on May 22, 1996 to end employment on June 10, 1996. Mr. Regan
asked me to continue working or to work for him at his other
store. I refused regular employment but offered to work in an
emergency (since I live across the street from The Grocery
Store). He never requested my assistance, so I returned his keys
on July 20, 1996.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, Karen Blount, requests the honorable
court for judgement as follows:
a. That this case be dismissed. Mr. Regan's complaint
fails to state a cause of action recognized by the law, he should
be awarded nothing.
b. Payment for any and all costs, expenses, and
attorney fees incurred by the Defendant in this complaint and for
any other relief this honorable court deems proper and correct.
c. A quick resolution of this matter as the Army is
transferring my family to another state this summer.
Dated this 1st day of April, 1997

Defendantfs address:
1235 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

MOTION AGAINST
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STEPHEN A. REGAN
DBA THE GROCERY STORE
PLAINTIFF, PRO SE
1224 SOUTH 400 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
TELEPHONE: (801) 485-2791
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II

STEPHEN A. REGAN
DBA THE GROCERY STORE,
PLAINTIFF,

MOTION AGAINST
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.
KAREN BLOUNT,
DEFENDANT.

CIVIL NO. 97-0002026
JUDGE S. McCLEVE

COMES NOW Plaintiff Regan and argues against Summary Judgment. Regan states the
following:
1. There are issues of fact that require a trial. Plaintiff Regan argues there was, in fact, an
oral agreement between Karen Blount and himself. Please see the attatched Affadivat of Steve
Regan wherein he states there was a specific agreement and an acceptance of said agreement
by Ms Blount. Furthermore, the Affidavit of Steve Moss states Ms. Blount was aware of an
agreement and that she did in fact commit to a (1) one year agreement. Ms. Blount argues the
opposite by stating, "At no time did I agree to work for a year". These are issues of fact and
require a trial.
2. The cases they cite on implied agreements don't apply. Those cases deal with the
employee trying to make the employment not at will, where here, the employment never was at
will but was for a year's term with termination only for good cause by either party.
3. Regan is entitled to sue for relief on a contract that was freely entered into by the other
party. Such a lawsuit would not be in bad faith because he (Regan) is entitled to the relief he
seeks. Furthermore, the statue allows for two (2) years.
4. When Regan discovered he would not be entitled to an award of punitive damages he
immediately withdrew the lawsuit. This shows good faith and is not an indication Regan was
acting in bad faith or was attempting to file a frivilious lawsuit.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 1997.

Steve A. Regan

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and accunrate copy of the
foregoing Motion To Dismiss, Affidavit of Steve Regan, Affidavit of Steve Moss and Motion
Against Summary Judgment to attorney for Karen Blount, David M. Cook, 211 East 300 South,
Suite 216, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 on this 3rd day of November, 1997.

Steve A. Regan

?"7

AFFIDAVIT OF
STEVE REGAN

STEPHEN A. REGAN
DBA THE GROCERY STORE
PLAINTIFF, PRO SE
1224 SOUTH 400 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
TELEPHONE: (801) 485-2791

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II

STEPHEN A. REGAN
DBA THE GROCERY STORE,

PLAINTIFF,

AFFIDAVIT OF

STEVE REGAN

VS.
PIVIL NO. 97-0002026

KAREN BLOUNT,

DEFENDANT.

STATE OF UTAH

JUDGE S. McCLEVE

)

SALT LAKE COUNTY )

ss.

Steve Regan, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am the owner/manager of The Grocery Store.

2.

On or about February 25,1996 I interviewed Karen Blount for a job at The Grocery Store.

3. During the interview I specifically asked Ms. Blount if she would commit to work for me, at
The Grocery Store, for a period of one (1) year. Ms. Blount specifically said "Yes".
4. As an inducement for Ms. Blount to work for a period of one (1) year I agreed to (a), give her
the total number of hours she needed; (b), give her the hours she needed when she wanted
these hours; and (c), pay her at a higher rate per hour than I would have normally paid a new
employee.
5. When I hired Ms. Blount I did so at the expense of other potential employees. In other
words, I hired her and not others.

6. There were certain delays in the filing of this lawsuit. I tried to give Ms Blount every
opportunity to come back to work. I needed her at the store and I appreciated her efforts. I was
only hoping Ms. Blount would see the errors in her thinking. I wanted her to come back to work.
7. I brought this fawsuit, not to harrass Ms. Blount, but to make sure future employees would
not take so lightly their committment to work for me, especially when I had gone way out of my
way to give them every possible codnsideration.
8. It is standard policy at The Grocery Store to pay cash for most products brought into the
store. This eleviates the potential robbery problem of large amounts of available cash in the
store.
9. It was a hardship and an annoyance when Ms. Blount quit her employment at The Grocery
Store.

DATED this 2nd day of November, 1997.

AFFIDAVIT OF
STEVE MOSS

STEPHEN A. REGAN
DBA THE GROCERY STORE
PLAINTIFF, PRO SE
1224 SOUTH 400 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
TELEPHONE: (801) 485-2791

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II

STEPHEN A. REGAN
DBA THE GROCERY STORE,

PLAINTIFF,

AFFIDAVIT OF

STEVE MOSS

VS.
CIVIL NO/ 97-0002026

KAREN BLOUNT,

DEFENDANT.

STATE OF UTAH

)

SALT LAKE COUNTY

)

JUDGE'S. McCLEVE

ss.

Steve Moss, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am over the age of 21, I am a citizen of the State of Utah and I read and write the English
language. I make this affidavit on personsal knowledge.
2.

I have been employed by Mr. Regan, at The Grocery Store, for 3 1/2 years.

3. During my employment I have had the responsibility to train new employees. Part of my
duties included answering questions and explaining company policy.
4. On or about February 28, 1996 I trained Karen Blount, who was just beginning her
employment at The Grocery Store.
5. During her training she asked me if I had agreed to a one (1) year committment to work at
the Grocery Store, to which I replied " Yes, I had". I then asked her if Mr. Regan had made
the same request of her, to which she replied," Yes, but it is a strange request".
6. By the questions Ms. Blount asked, I was under the impression she was aware of her one
(1) year committment to work at The Grocery Store.

7. By the questions Ms. Blount asked, I was under the impression she was going to work for
Mr. Regan for a period of one (1) year.
8. It is standard policy at The Grocery Store to pay cash for most products brought into the
store. This eleviates the potential robbery problem of large amounts of available cash in the
store. This policy is also prevelent at many of the "c" stores in Salt Lake, for which I am familiar.
9. In all the years I have worked for Mr. Regan I have never had a "bounced" or "returned"
check. Furthermore, I have never known of a fellow employee who had a "bounced" or
"returned" check.
10. It was a hardship and an annoyance when Ms. Blount quit her employment at The Grocery
Store.

DATED this 2nd day of November, 1997.

ORDER &
JUDGMENT

David M. Cook (#7043)
Attorney for Defendant
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-2009
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
&P*SMsyLj^EWkTY
DIVISION II, STATE OF UTAH
ORDER & JUDGMENT

STEPHEN A. REGAN
d.b.a. THE GROCERY STORE
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 970002026

vs.

Honorable Judge Sheila K McCleve

KAREN BLOUNT,
Defendant.

This matter came before this court upon the written Motion of the Defendant Karen
Blount, represented by David M. Cook, Attorney at Law and the Plaintiff, Stephan A. Regan,
represented Pro Se.
The Defendant having submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Costs,
Fees, and Sanctions and the Plaintiff having responded to the motions of the Defendant and the
Court having received those documents into evidence and being fully advised in the premises.
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendant, Karen Blount is hereby awarded summary judgment against the Plaintiff, Stephan A
Regan d.b.a. The Grocery Store together with attorneys fees and costs as will be supported by
affidavit as well as interest thereon at the statutory rate of 7.45% and further costs of collection
Dated this

Ci

day of

19Sg
BY THE COURT:

c^

V

Honorable Judge Sheila K. McCleve
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

Stephan A. Regan d.b.a. The Grocery Store

Z'x S

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed/faxed/hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
unsigned (proposed) Order & Judgment to:
Stephen A. Regan
d.b.a. The Grocery Store
1224 South 400 East
S.L.C., Utah 84111
on this

day of December, 1997.
l5avid M. Cook (7043)

OBJECTION TO
PROPOSED AMENDED
ORDER & JUDGMENT

STEPHEN A. REGAN
DBA THE GROCERY STORE
PLAINTIFF, PRO SE
1224 SOUTH 400 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
TELEPHONE: (8Q1) 485-2791
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II

STEPHEN A. REGAN
DBA THE GROCERY STORE,
PLAINTIFF,

VS.
KAREN BLOUNT,

OBJECTION TO
PROPOSED
AMENDED ORDER
AND JUDGMENT
CIVIL NO. 97-0002026
JUDGE S. McCLEVE

DEFENDANT.
COMES NOW Plaintiff Regan, and hereby submits his Objection to Proposed
Amended Order and Judgment, based upon the following:
1. In the instant case there are issues of fact There is a controversy betweer
the parties as to wheather or not there was an agreement. Plaintiff states the
affirmative and Defendant states the negative.
2. Plaintiff Regan provided two (2) affidavits in support of his case. These
sworn statements can not be overlooked.
3. The Affidavit of Steve Moss is admissabte under the hearsay rule because
it is an admission against a party.
4. The agreement between Plaintiff Regan and Defendant Biount was not a
will. The agreement between the two parties was not in violation of the Statute of
Fraud because the term of the agreement was for one year. Because the
agreement was for a period of one year then the agreement did not need to be in
writting.
5. The award of attorney fees requires a finding of basis for attorney fees to b<
awarded, and none has been found. Furthermore, the amount claimed as fees is

not reasonable, especially since this matter has an excellent chance of being
reversed.
6. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52 (a) require a brief, written statement of
the grounds for decision. There has not been a written statement issued by the
Court.
7. Based upon the entry of the proposed Amended Order and Judgment,
mailed January 28, 1998, Plaintiff is filing a Motion to Reconsider.
DATED THIS 5th day of February, 1998.

j$^yjLs
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Stephen A. Regan
Plaintiff, Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that! mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and accurate
copy of the foregoing, Objection to Proposed Amended Order and Judgment, to
Karen Blount's attorney, David M. Cook, 211 East 300 South, Suite 216, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84111, on this 5th day of February, 1998.

7*1 fy*.
Steve A. Regan

AMENDED
ORDER & JUDGMENT

David M. Cook (#7043)
Attorney for Defendant
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-2009

m - i (998
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
DIVISION II, STATE OF UTAH
AMENDED ORDER & JUDGMENT

STEPHEN A. REGAN
d.b.a. THE GROCERY STORE
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 970002J026
Honorable Jtfdee Sheila K. McCleve

KAREN BLOUNT,
Defendant.

This matter came before this court upon the written Motion of the Defendant Karen
Blount, represented by David M. Cook, Attorney at Law and the Plaintiff, Stephan A. Regan,
represented Pro Se.
The Defendant having submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Costs,
Fees, and Sanctions and the Plaintiff having responded to the motions of the Defendant and the
Court having received those documents into evidence and being fully advised in the premises.
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendant, Karen Blount is hereby awarded summary judgment against the Plaintiff, Stephan A.
Regan d.b.a. The Grocery Store together with attorneys fees and costs in the total amount of
$1,663.70 as is supported by Defendant's Affidavit of Fees and Costs well as interest thereon at
the statutory rate of 7.45% and further costs of collection.
Dated this / ^

day of

^JC&zt**^

, 1998.

BY THE C O T J 0 £ ^ • • •''?' ' ~~ v

Honorable fudge Sheila K. McCleve/
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

-y

^;

Stephan A. Regan d.b.a. The Grocery Store

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed/faxed/hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
unsigned (proposed) Amended Order & Judgment to:
Stephen A. Regan
d.b.a. The Grocery Store
1224 South 400 East
S.L.C., Utah 84111

zf%.

on this ^-f> day of January, 1998.
David M. Cook (7043)

